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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a recurring trend has emerged in the United
States financial markets: following a period of seemingly
unprecedented market prosperity, a select group of perceived
heroes has been transformed almost overnight from being
celebrated trendsetters into reviled scapegoats.' In the 1980s
Michael Milken was the revolutionary junk bond king.' Milken
was an innovator,3 but faced his demise with his infamous cohort
Ivan Boesky after being jailed for using insider information.4
Thereafter, in the early 1990s, Long-Term Capital Management
and its partners, considered geniuses on Wall Street, suffered their
downfall when interest rates took a turn for the worst and the
company that seemed foolproof faced financial disaster.' Today
J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2002. Many thanks to the members
of the 2002-2003 editorial board of the Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law for their assistance.
1. See Tom Petruno, Enron and Ivan Boesky: Symbols of Their Eras,
LATIMES.COM, Jan. 13, 2002, available at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-
000003084janl3.column?coll=la-utilities-business (last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
2. See Andrew Gumbel, The Resurrection; Everyone Thought Michael
Milken, the Disgraced Junk Bond King, Was Washed Up. But He's Back-and
This Time He's Going to Help Save Mankind, INDEPENDENT (London), June 9,
1999, at Bus. 1.
3. Milken has often been credited with revolutionizing the capital markets.
See, e.g., Mike Milken's Biography, at
http://www.mikemilken.com/mikebio.html (last visited Mar. 4. 2002).
4. See Ian King, Millions of Us Lose Out, SUN, Feb. 3, 2000.
5. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE
AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (Random House Trade
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there is a new breed of evil genius on Wall Street, the financial
analyst. Financial analysts are so called because the demise of both
the Internet stocks and Enron came with little or no warning from
these "experts." The result being that the integrity of "name"
financial analysts was undermined in the eyes of the public,6 which
in turn made Congress take action by initiating investigations into
Wall Street's financial analysts.7
In an attempt to mitigate damages the industry responded with
self-regulation.8 Broker-dealers instituted internal procedures that
placed restrictions on analysts whom they employ, and the
Paperbacks 2000) (providing a history of and insight into the financial theories
and practices behind Long-Term Capital Management).
6. See Enron and Wall Street Analysts: Hearings on the Collapse of Enron:
The Role Analysts Played and the Conflicts They Face Before the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Frank Torres,
Legislative Counsel, Consumers Union) [hereinafter Torres Testimony].
7. For Congressional Testimony discussing the Internet bust, see infra note
55. Additionally, Congress has recently initiated its investigation into the Enron
disaster. See supra note 6 & infra note 46 (providing examples of testimony taken
with respect to Enron); see also Andres Rueda, The Hot IPO Phenomenon and
the Great Internet Bust, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21, 54-81 (2001)
(providing an explanation of the role of the analyst in the internet IPO
phenomenon); Marilyn Greewax, Congress Warns Stock Analysts May Face
Regulation, Cox NEWS SERV. (June 14, 2001) (chronicling the Congressional
investigation into the role analysts played in the Internet phenomenon); Jaimee
Campbell, Comment, Analyst Liability and the Internet Bubble: The Morgan
Stanley/Mary Meeker Cases, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 235 (2001)
(chronicling cases brought against financial analysts as a result of losses suffered
in the internet boom); Gretchen Morgenson, Wall Street's Analysis Put on the
Defensive at a Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2001, at C4 (providing examples of
analysts being called unethical at hearings after the internet craze); Enron Corp.
and Wall Street Analysts: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Bowman Testimony] (statement of
Thomas A. Bowman, CFA, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Association for Investment Management and Research) (stating that the
activities at Enron caused financial losses in the market and as a consequence a
lack of confidence in financial analysts).
& See Morgenson, supra note 7 (explaining that the Securities Industry
Association issued voluntary practices for analysts); see also Unger Testimony,
infra note 55 (explaining that Merrill Lynch and Credit Suisse First Boston had
put restrictions on their analysts); John Labate, NYSE Review Its Rules on
Analyst Disclosure, FIN. TIMEs (London), Aug. 14, 2001, at 22 (purporting that
Goldman Sachs also has put restrictions on its analysts).
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Securities Industry Association ("SIA") published a guide for
analysts and broker-dealers alike.9 However, after the Internet
bust left many asking questions,"0 the colossal collapse of Enron,
when again analysts failed to recognize problems, provoked the
industry regulators to take action. In February 2002, the Self
Regulatory Organizations ("SROs")" entered the fray, 2 making
regulatory rule proposals to the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"). The National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") proposed a new rule, 2711, and the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") proposed amendments to its Rule 472
(Communications with the Public)."
To put some realism into the severity of the situation, , more
than ten articles relating to the SRO proposals appeared in the
Wall Street Journal alone in the month following the publication of
the proposals." Moreover, shareholders have brought suits against
9. See supra note 8 (providing examples of the broker-dealer and SIA
initiatives).
10. See Torres Testimony, supra note 6 (stating that after analyst failure and
plummeting stock prices in the internet industry, many were left asking "what
went wrong," including the media, regulatory community and those on Capital
Hill).
11. The Self Regulatory Organizations were promulgated by the federal
securities laws and assist in the regulation of the securities and futures industries.
See Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities
Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L.
REv. 475, 476-79. They promulgate industry rules that are subject to the
approval of the Securities Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve
Board, which are federal agencies. See BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 553 (5th ed. 1998).
12. See Labate, supra note 8 (explaining that the NYSE was reviewing their
rules as well as mentioning the changes by firms Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse
First Boston and Goldman Sachs, not to mention the rules of the NASD).
13. See NYSE and NYSE Rulemaking, Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Changes by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York
Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest (Feb.
2002), available at www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45526.htm (last visited Mar. 17,
2002).
14. See Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch Told to Change Ways, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 9, 2002, at Cl; Susan Pulliam, Analysts to Tell Congress That Skepticism
Gets Abuse, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2002, at Cl; Karen Talley, Merrill May Be
Alone in Attempt to Toughen Corporate Reviews, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2002, at
C14; Phyllis Plitch, Analysts Rush to Put Out Fires of Clients, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6,
2003]
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analysts, which until now have been dismissed.'5 The culmination
of the backlash occurred on April 9, 2002, when Eliot Spitzer, the
attorney general for New York State, won a court order, "forcing
Merrill Lynch & Co. to overhaul its research [procedures] .... ,,6
Spitzer's inquiry has already moved beyond Merrill Lynch."
This Note will respond to the SROs' proposed rules. Part I
will review the traditional role of securities analysts. Part II will
provide a review of the many conflicts these analysts face. Part III
will provide a review of the new rules and their attempt to address
each of the conflicts analysts face. Finally, Part IV will analyze
these proposed rules, for better or worse.
I. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE SECURITIES ANALYST
Generally, a financial analyst is a "person in a brokerage
house, bank trust department, or mutual fund group who studies a
number of companies and makes buy or sell recommendations on
the securities of particular companies and industry groups."' 8
Basically, analysts review public information in order to make buy
or sell recommendations.'9 An analyst will also "actively seek out
bits and pieces of corporate information not generally known to
the market for the express purpose of analyzing that
2002, at B4; Karen Talley, Merrill Lynch Directs Analysts to Look Deeper Than
Pro Forma, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2002, at Cl; Tom Hamburger, Senate Panel
Grills Analysts Who Pushed Enron Stock Even As the Firm Faltered, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 28, 2002, at A3; Randall Smith & Debora Solomon, Salomon May
Downgrade Jack Grubman, As Telecom Analyst's Dual Roles Grate, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 28, 2002, at Cl; Randall Smith, Analysts; Picks of Enron Stock Face
Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2002, at Cl; Karen Tally, Some Technical Analysts
Fall Off the Charts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, at B5A; Goldman Picks New
Heads of Research, Sets Stock Ban, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, at C16.
15. See Campbell, supra note 7, at 235.
16. Gasparino, supra note 14, at Cl.
17. See Alison Taylor, Investment Banking Probe Widens beyond Merrill
Lynch, WORLD MKTS. ANALYSIS, Apr. 10, 2002.
18. BARRON'S, supra note 11, at 24.
19. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Investor Alert: Analyzing
Analyst Recommendations (2001), at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm (last modified July 13, 2001)
[hereinafter Analyzing Analyst Recommendations].
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information ... "20
More specifically, the analyst will review financial information,
and gather both qualitative and quantitative information. 2' An
analyst will collect earnings data, information about federal
actions, interest rates and social and economic trends." Analysts
must review this information for current and future expectations,
compare it to the industry and then make future predictions while
balancing these predictions against future risks like market risk or
cyclical factors.' Thereafter, a report is put together which
balances all of these factors, including the analyst's opinion and
predictions, which are based on experience and logic.24 Thus, "as
you can see the role of the analyst is multifaceted."2 Given the
complexity of the job it seems obvious why most analysts specialize
in either a few companies or one industry or sector.26
In the U.S. markets, analysts are said to play a key role in
promoting efficient market pricing by gathering available
information and sorting it out. Indeed the United States Supreme
Court recognized this proposition in Dirks v. SEC, explaining that
the analyst is key to healthy markets because they provide
objective evaluations of companies." They do this by, "evaluating,
verifying, and researching corporate disclosures required by the
securities laws, and in disseminating company-specific information
to the market as a whole."29
The role of the analyst to broker-dealers is centered on
20. In re Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 47 S.E.C. 434
(Jan. 22, 1981).
21. See Frank Fernandez, The Roles and Responsibilities of Securities
Analysts, 7 RES. REP. 3, 3-4 (2001), available at
http://www.sia.com/reference-materials/pdf/RsrchRprtVol2-7.pdf (last visited Oct.
19, 2002).
22. See Rueda, supra note 7.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. Fernandez, supra note 21, at 4.
26. See BARRON'S, supra note 11; Analyzing Analyst Recommendations,
supra note 19; Fernandez, supra note 21, at 3.
27. See Torres Testimony, supra note 6.
28. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
29. Rueda, supra note 7, at 54.
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generating revenue; they are not employed as a public service."
An analyst's recommendation sells securities and makes the
company money." Moreover, as will be discussed later, certain
recommendations can assist in bringing in investment banking
business for a broker-dealer." Other companies, like mutual funds,
use analysts internally to assist in the purchase and sale of
securities in their own account.3 These distinctions are extremely
important in the current debate, because the only groups of
analysts under fire are the ones working for broker-dealers.34
An analyst's employer is an important distinction in
understanding the proposed NASD and NYSE rules because most
of the conflicts a broker-dealer's analyst faces is as a result of their
employer. The three general types of analysts are buy-side, sell-
side and independent." The sell-side analysts are the ones at issue
in the SROs proposed rules. Typically the sell-side analysts work
for a full service broker-dealer.36 "Many of the more popular sell-
side analysts work for prominent brokerage firms that also provide
investment banking services for corporate clients-including
companies whose securities the analysts cover."" This is the root
of many conflicts. 8 The buy-side analyst, "typically work[s] for
institutional money managers-such as mutual funds, hedge funds,
or investment advisors-that purchase securities for their own
accounts. They counsel their employers on which securities to buy,
30. See David Becker, Analyzing Analysts, Remarks Before the Committee
on Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar Association (Aug. 7,
2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch510.htm (last modified
Aug. 9, 2001).
31. See id.
32. See infra Part II.A (providing a review of the conflicts of interest facing
analysts with regard to the investment banking department).
33. See Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, supra note 19 (providing a
definition of a buy-side analyst).
34. See infra Part III (providing a review of the conflicts of interest at issue to
the sell-side analyst).
35. See Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, supra note 19 (providing a
definition of the three types of securities analysts).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See infra Part II.A (providing a review of the investment banking
conflicts faced by financial analysts).
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hold, or sell and stand to make money when they make good
calls."39 Finally, independent research analysts typically do their
research and publish it on a subscription or other basis."°
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FACED BY SECURITIES ANALYSTS
Sell-side analyst conflicts are not a new phenomenon; they are
almost "as old as Wall Street.""1 For instance, complaints can be
traced to the 1929 crash when again analysts failed to recognize the
problems and predict the changing tide of the market in the pre
crash economy. 2 However, in recent years there has been an
increased amount of conflicts spotlighted. This change is due in
large part to three main occurrences. First, the growth in
investment banking revenues to broker-dealers has caused an
increase in conflicts when an analyst attempts to provide quality
research about clients or potential clients of their firm." Second,
during the recent bull market, analysts were treated as media stars,
getting them lots of exposure, which is good on the upside but
when the market suffers a downturn their mistakes are even more
pronounced." Finally, there was an explosion in stock market
participation by the individual investor and these customers had
more access to the information analysts provided. 5
39. See Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, supra note 19.
40. See id.
41. Letter from Barbara L. Roper, Director of Investor Protection,
Consumer Federation of America, to Barbara Z. Sweeney, Office of the
Corporate Secretary, NASD Regulation, Inc., (Aug. 15, 2001), at
http://www.consumer-action.org/Library/English/Alert/AT-I-12_EN/AT-I-
12_EN.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Roper Letter].
42 See Fernandez, supra note 21, at 6 (providing a quotation from the period
1927-1934 chronicling the loss of prestige of analysts due to the market
conditions after the stock market crash of 1929).
43. See id.
44. See id. at 6; see also Simon Goodley, End of an Era As Blodget Walks,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 20, 2001, at 30.
45. See Hearings on Analyst Independence: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong.. (2002) [hereinafter Glauber
Testimony] (statement of Robert R. Glauber, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.) (stating that investment
activity moved from Wall Street to Main Street and that investors had access to
more and more information via various media mediums like television and
2003]
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Recent studies have illustrated the effect of the
abovementioned conflicts of interest. For instance it has been said
that in recent years one-third of all recommendations were strong
buys or some variation of that top recommendation (since analysts'
terminology varies by broker-dealer), one-third buys, and one-
third holds."6 Thus, the sell recommendations represented less than
2% of all recommendations. Another study indicated that sell-
side analysts, whose firms have investment banking activities, have
6% higher earnings forecasts and 25% more buy recommendations
then do analysts who do not have ties to underwriting activities."
Other studies state that recently the buy sell ratio was 66:1 from 6:1
a decade ago. Due to the scarcity of sell recommendations, the
industry has come to regard a hold recommendation as a sign to
sell, something that many retail customers do not know."
Thus, in an attempt to eliminate these conflicts, the SROs
have proposed their rules." The conflicts these rules address can
be broken up into three categories, conflicts as a result of
investment banking, 2 conflicts resulting from the desire to provide
more investment profits for a broker-dealer,53 and finally, personal
conflicts of analysts, their employers, and its institutional
newspapers and the internet); Roper Letter, supra note 41.
46. See Enron Corp. and Wall Street Analysts: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Hill
Testimony] (statement of Charles L. Hill, CFA, Director of Research, Thomson
Financial/First Call); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Virtue and the Securities
Analyst, N.Y. L.J., July 19, 2001, at 5 (stating that 29% of recommendations were
strong buy, 37% buy, 31% hold, 1% sell and .4% strong sell).
47. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 5.
48. See Reporting, Accounting Oversight: Hearings Before the Senate Banking
Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Coffee
Testimony] (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor, Columbia University
School of Law) (citing a CFO Magazine report).
49. Coffee, supra note 46, at 5.
50. See Fernandez, supra note 21, at 7; Analyzing Analyst Recommendations,
supra note 19; see also Hill Testimony, supra note 46 (stating that most "holds"
mean "sell" and that individual investors need to decode this information).
51. See infra Part IV (providing a review of the proposed NYSE and NASD
rules).
52. See infra Part IILA.
53. See infra Part III.B.
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customers.
A. Conflicts As a Result of Broker-Dealer Investment Banking
Activities
The conflicts resulting from investment banking activities are
"in large part [due] to a blurring of the lines between research"
analysts and a firm's investment banking department.5  In this
category two major conflicts arise. One is when an analyst helps to
attract and retain clients of the investment banking department. 6
Second, conflicts are created when an analyst's salary and/or bonus
is connected to the success of the investment banking department. 7
It is this conflict that drew the attention of the attorney general,
Eliot Spitzer, in his crusade to prosecute broker-dealers for
allowing investment banking revenues to conflict with the integrity
of the broker-dealer's research departments. 8
1. Analyst Conflicts Resulting From Drawing and Maintaining
Investment Banking Clients.
In the first instance, conflicts present themselves when a
broker-dealer either: (1) has an investment banking client who the
broker-dealer has already provided underwriting services to and
wants to continue the relationship; or (2) the broker-dealer wants
to attract new investment banking clients. 9 First, a conflict can
simply arise if the analyst participated on the underwriting team
that brought the existing client's securities to market.' An SEC
examination found that there was a significant amount of
assistance rendered by analysts to investment banking teams in the
54. See infra Part III.C.
55. Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and Their Research
Analysts: Hearings on the Quality of Wall Street Research Before the House
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Gov't-Sponsored Enterprises, 106th
Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Unger Testimony] (statement of Laura S. Unger,
Acting Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Gasparino, supra note 14, at C1.
59. See id.
60. See id.
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underwriting process.6 In the past, "Chinese Walls" were erected
between the investment banking and research departments. 62
However, recently there has been a trend to bring the analyst over
this wall and involve them in the due diligence and marketing of a
new offering, making the line between the firm's analyst as a
provider of information for the retail customer and as a participant
in the investment banking department a very gray area.63
It is important to understand the pressures placed on an
analyst, from both their employers and its investment banking
clients to provide positive recommendations about the clients. The
outcome of these pressures has been shown in recent studies
providing evidence that recommendations by an analyst whose
company underwrote an offering was positively biased as
compared to those not involved in the offering. ' Why are these
recommendations skewed? Because the investment banking side
of a broker-dealer can provide significant revenues for a broker-
dealer and, as such, an analyst would not want to jeopardize an
investment banking relationship.65
It is most evident when reviewing the IPO process. The
investment banking department must attract the new customer. In
one study, 20% of CFOs acknowledged that if an analyst issued
bad press on the CFO's company, the company would not use the
services of that analyst's employer.66 Furthermore, other studies
have shown that the quality of the research department was taken
into account by 75% of CEOs and CFOs when choosing a broker-
dealer.67 One reason this is important is because the management
will face a lock-up prohibiting them from selling the company's
61. See id.
62. See generally BARRON'S, supra note 11, at 94 (providing a definition of
Chinese Wall).
63. Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflicts of Interest and Credibility of
Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653, 655 (1999).
64. Id. at 653, 656 (citing a 1997 study by Dechow, Hutton and Sloan which
also indicated that an underwriting firm's analyst provided more optimistic
forecasts than others).
65. See Glauber Testimony, supra note 45.
66. Coffee Testimony, supra note 48 (citing a speech by Laura Unger
providing this statistic).
67. Michaely & Womack, supra note 63, at 654 (citing a 1992 study by Galant
and a 1999 study by Krigman, Shaw and Womack).
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stock for a certain amount of time after it is offered." A good
research department will support the stock so that it will maintain
a good price in the aftermarket and therefore profit management.
6 9
Thus, "implicit in the underwriter-issuer relationship is the
underwriter's intention to follow the newly issued security in the
aftermarket: that is, to provide (presumably positive) analyst
coverage."7
Once the securities are issued, positive reviews will keep the
client happy and allow continued business to flow to the broker-
dealer.7 Moreover, after the offering, the broker-dealer may own
a significant amount of the issuer's stock and, as such, positive
reviews will help bolster the price for the broker-dealer in addition
to the management of the company." A Morgan Stanley
memorandum confirmed the fact that the company, as a matter of
policy, did not make negative or controversial comments about
clients." Studies of analysts themselves have further reported that
61% of them have felt pressure to give a positive recommendation
or tone down a negative comment.
Not only have analysts felt this pressure, but to make matters
worse, their research reports have sometimes been subject to
discretion by the investment banking department. For instance,
the SEC found that the investment banking department is often
given advance notice when there is a change in an analyst's
recommendation of a company.75
2. Investment Banking Conflicts Resulting from Compensation
Practices
Beyond political pressure to make good recommendations,
68. See Coffee Testimony, supra note 48.
69. See Coffee, supra note 46.
70. Id.
71. See Michaely & Womack, supra note 63, at 655.
72. NASD, Understanding Securities Analyst Recommendations (2002), at
http://www.nasdr.com/analyst__guide.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2002) [hereinafter
Understanding Analyst Recommendations].
73. See Michael Siconolfi, At Morgan Stanley, Analysts Were Urged to Soften
Harsh Views, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1992, at Al.
74. Coffee Testimony, supra note 48.
75. See Unger Testimony, supra note 55.
2003]
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there can be economic conflicts for a research analyst. Frequently,
an analyst's compensation or bonus will be tied to the investment
banking division.7" At some firms, the investment banking
department actually reviews analysts to help determine their
compensation.77 All this puts more pressure on analysts to give a
good recommendation because a bad rating could lower
investment banking revenue and in turn their pay.78 Moreover, an
analyst's reputation is connected to the quality of the research they
produce, complicating matters because an analyst's compensation
is partially based on their external reputation.79
B. Conflicts As a Result of Broker-Dealer Profits
Beyond the investment banking department, analysts face
pressure to help their broker-dealers sell securities and thereby
produce commissions.'0 A buy recommendation will create more
buying and thus more commissions. Finally, a buy in this instance
is better than a sell "because all clients can buy a stock, but only
existing holders can sell . ... "S
C. Conflicts As a Result of Personal Conflicts of Analysts. Their
Employers and Their Customers
The last type of conflict faced by an analyst is based on the fact
that the analyst or the broker-dealer may own the stock or stocks
in the industry an analyst covers. This would cause the analyst to
be biased toward stocks they own for their own profit or stocks
their employers own for its own profit.83 Worse yet, if an analyst
contrives a plot to frontrun his recommendation, meaning he
would buy or sell the securities before his report is released and
76. See Unger Testimony, supra note 55; Understanding Analyst
Recommendations, supra note 72.
77. See Unger Testimony, supra note 55.
78. See Understanding Analyst Recommendations, supra note 72.
79. See Michaely & Womack, supra note 63, at 654.
80. See Unger Testimony, supra note 55.
81. Coffee Testimony, supra note 48.
82. See Understanding Analyst Recommendations, supra note 72.
83. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 5.
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profit from his inside information, the analyst would be guilty of
securities fraud.'A
This conflict also runs to institutional customers" of the
broker-dealer. 6 These institutional clients can pressure analysts to
bias ratings for their profit. The analysts would likely not comply
because they would not want to be responsible for losing these
valuable customers.' This problem is compounded by the fact that
analysts are given industry ratings and institutional investors often
give a significant amount of input into these ratings."'
III. THE NASD AND NYSE RULES
As a result of Enron and the Internet, many have compared
analysts to "glorified salespeople."89 Thus, in an attempt to remedy
this problem, the NASD and NYSE have proposed rules
addressing the problematic conflicts analysts face.'
A. NASD Proposed Rule 2711
A review of the NASD's rule follows. Broker-dealers must
implement the changes required according to this rule, but they
also must create supervisory procedures to ensure that the rule is
followed. Moreover, a senior officer must attest to the NASD that
the supervisory procedures were adopted and implemented on a
84. See id.
85. An institutional client is a group trading in large volumes, such as mutual
funds, pension funds and labor unions. See BARRON'S, supra note 11.
86. See Unger Testimony, supra note 55.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Rueda, supra note 7, at 57.
90. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, NASD and NYSE
Rulemaking, Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Changes by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
Relating to Research Analysts Conflicts of Interest (Mar. 8, 2002) (providing a
statement of purpose for their proposals from both the NASD and NYSE),
available at www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45526.htm (last modified Mar. 12, 2002);
Understanding Analyst Recommendations, supra note 72; Glauber Testimony,
supra note 45.
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yearly basis.'
1. Investment Banking Restrictions
The first topic addressed by NASD's proposed Rule 2711 is in
connection with the investment banking department.92 The rule
prohibits an analyst from being subject to the supervision or
control of any member of the investment banking department. 9
The investment banking department is prohibited from reviewing
an analyst's report prior to publication, unless it is to verify factual
accuracy or to ascertain if there are any conflicts of interest in the
report.9 Moreover, any written communications between the
analyst and investment banking division must be done via or
copied to legal or compliance personnel and oral communications
must be documented and made through or in the presence of legal
or compliance personnel. 95
The NASD rule also limits a research report from being
provided to the subject company prior to publication; it is only to
be supplied in order to verify facts.96 Additionally, the portion
containing the rating and price target as well as the research
summary cannot be provided to the company at all.97
Simultaneously, the compliance department must receive a copy of
the full report and thereafter if any changes are to be made to the
rating or price target the legal or compliance department must
approve the changes.98 Moreover, the rule forbids broker-dealers
from notifying an issuer of its intention to change a rating of that
issuer prior to publication.99
The rule also tries to remove investment banking conflicts by
prohibiting analyst compensation from being connected to a
91. Proposed Rule 2711, Release No. 34-45526, File No. SR-NASD-2002-21,
§ 2711(i), available at www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45526.htm (last modified Mar. 12,
2002).
92. Id. § 2711(b).
93. Id. § 2711(b)(1).
94. Id. §§ 2711(b)(1)-(2).
95. Id. §§ 2711(b)(3)(A)-(B).
96. Id. §§ 2711(c)(1)-(2).
97. Id. § 2711(c)(2)(A).
98. Id. §§ 2711(c)(2)(B)-(C).
99. Id. § 2711(c)(3).
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specific investment banking service or transaction."' Finally it tries
to limit solicitation of clientele by barring any offers for favorable
research to companies in consideration for business,"' and it
restricts the bolstering of a stock in the post IPO phase.1 It does
this by imposing a quiet period, during which no research can be
released for 40 days for IPOs and 10 days in a secondary offering,
for a broker-dealer acting as manager or co-manager of an
offering. 3 The member can only issue research during the quiet
period if there is significant news or events affecting the company
and the legal or compliance department approves such release."'4
2. Personal Conflict Restrictions
The proposed rule imposes the following restrictions on an
analyst's trading:
" An analyst cannot purchase or receive securities before an
IPO if the analyst covers the company, sector or industry in
which the company conducts business;0 5
" An analyst cannot purchase or sell stock for a company the
analyst follows, including options and derivatives, for 30
days before and after a research report is released or a
change in rating or price target is made. However, a broker-
dealer can permit a research analyst to sell all of the
securities they hold within 30 days after they begin to follow
a company and additionally the broker-dealer can approve a
purchase or sale in the 30 days before and after a report
based on significant news or events affecting the company is
issued;""
" An analyst is restricted from purchasing or selling the stock
100. Id. §2711(d).
101. Id. §2711(e).
102. Id. § 2711(f).
103. Id. §§ 2711(f)(1)-(2).
104. Id. §2711(f).
105. Id. § 2711(g)(1).
106. Id. §§ 2711(g)(2)(A)-(B).
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of a company, including options or derivatives on the stock,
which is inconsistent with the analyst's recommendation
from their most recent published report. 7
The purchase and sale rules can be circumvented if approved
by the legal or compliance department of a broker-dealer but only
in the face of "significant personal financial circumstances.""
Additionally, there are less stringent policies with regard to
investment companies and mutual funds owned by an analyst, even
though these investments may include securities from a company,
sector or industry the analyst covers. 9
3. Disclosure in the Proposed NASD Rule
Finally, the NASD rule imposes a significant amount of
disclosure requirements on an analyst and broker-dealer. It
requires disclosure when an analyst makes public appearances and
in a research report if: (1) the analyst or anyone in their household
has a financial interest in the company; (2) as of five business days
from the appearance or report the broker-dealer beneficially
owned 1% or more of any class of equity; and (3) any other
material conflicts exist for the analyst or broker-dealer are known
of.
0
With regard to the investment banking division, the research
report must disclose any compensation received by an analyst
preparing the report that was connected to investment banking
revenue."' Additionally, the report must disclose if the broker-
dealer received compensation from the issuer within one year of
the report or if it expects to receive such compensation within
three months of the report.' Finally, in public appearances, if an
analyst has reason to know that an issuer is a client of the member,
the analyst must disclose this information.'
107. Id. § 2711(g)(3).
108. Id. § 2711(g)(4).
109. Id. § 2711(g)(5).
110. Id. § 2711(h)(1).
111. Id. § 2711(h)(2)(A)(i).
112. Id. § 2711(h)(2)(A)(ii).
113. Id. § 2711(h)(2)(B).
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The rule also requires disclosure if an analyst, or anyone in
their household, is an officer, director or advisory board member
of the covered company."' An analyst must do this in both the
research report and in a public appearance. 5
The NASD rule also requires disclosure, so that the individual
investor can comprehend fully the information in the report. It
requires an explanation of the ratings system employed in the
report, with plain meaning definitions of each type of
recommendation, such as buy, sell or neutral."6 The research
report must disclose what percent of recommendations made by
the broker-dealer fall into the defined categories, as well as
disclose the percentage of the companies covered that the broker-
dealer provided investment banking services for in the previous
year."7 The valuation methods for price targets must be displayed
including risks that can prevent the price from reaching that
target."8 The report must include price charts showing the price of
the stock during the time the broker-dealer assigned a rating."9 On
the price chart the broker-dealer must indicate any changes in
ratings and the date of those changes."l Finally, the broker-dealer
must disclose if it is a market maker in the company for which it is
releasing a research report.'2'
None of the disclosures for the purposes of this rule can be
hidden in footnotes or buried in the report.' 22 They must be on the
front page or the front page must refer the reader to the page
where the required disclosures can be found.
B. NYSE Pro-osed Amendments to Rule 472 and 351
In contrast to the NASD, the NYSE's rules require advance
114. Id. § 2711(h)(3).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 2711(h)(4).
117. Id. §§ 2711(h)(5)(A)-(B).
11A Id. § 2711(h)(7).
119. Id. § 2711(h)(6).
120. Id. § 2711(h)(6) (A).
121. Id. § 2711(h)(8).
122. Id. § 2711(h)(10).
123. Id.
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approval of a report before distribution by a "member, allied
member, supervisory analyst, or qualified person."'24 Additionally,
the reports must be prepared or approved by a supervisory analyst,
or approved by another supervisory analyst if the analyst's
immediate supervisor does not have expertise in the field, and
finally, if the firm does not have the expertise, by another broker-
dealer who is a member of the NYSE.'" Moreover, the NYSE
requires that these communications be retained and that the
person approving the materials must be ascertainable from the
records.'26  If anything, the NYSE rule makes more people
responsible for a report and hopefully more conscientious.
However, just like the NASD, the NYSE requires written
supervisory procedures for the implementation of the proposed
rule changes, and requires yearly attestations by a senior officer, or
partner." The remainder of the NYSE rule is almost identical to
the NASD, the following is review of the rule with notations when
there is a divergence from the NASD rule.
1. Investment Banking Rules
The restrictions imposed by the NYSE on investment banking
approvals of research reports and company approvals of research
reports are basically identical to those imposed by the NASD.
They both forbid investment banking from having supervisory, or
any other, control over an analyst and prohibit pre-approval by
investment bankers except on the basis of verification of accuracy
or to find conflicts. Both also require the Legal or Compliance
Department to mediate exchanges between analysts and
investment bankers in the exact same way." With respect to an
issuer, like the NASD, the issuer can only receive portions of the
124. Proposed Rule 472, Release No. 34-45526, File No. SR-NYSE-2002-09,
§ 472(a)(1), available at www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45526.htm (last modified Mar.
12, 2002).
125. Id. § 472(a)(2).
126. Id. § 472(d).
127. See id. § 472(c); Proposed Rule 351, Release No. 34-45526, File No. SR-
NYSE-2002-09, § 351(f), available at www.sec.govlrules/sro/34-45526.htm (last
modified Mar. 12, 2002).
128. Proposed Rule 472, supra note 124, §§ 472(b)(1)-(2).
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report to verify facts, and exactly like the NASD the compliance
department must receive a draft when it goes to the company and
must approve all changes in an analyst's recommendation after
that time.29 Finally, just like the NASD it prohibits a broker-
dealer from notifying a company of changes in rating until one day
prior to the change but only after the close of trading that day)3
As with the NASD rule, the NYSE imposes the same quiet
period on research reports for broker-dealers who provided
investment banking services, 40 days for an IPO and 10 days for
secondary offerings, with an exception for extraordinary news or
events when prior approval has been given by the legal or
compliance department.'31 Like the NASD, the NYSE prohibits
promises of favorable research in order to solicit clients.'32
However, the NYSE's compensation rule is a little different than
that proposed by the NASD; it does restrict the broker-dealer from
compensating or providing bonuses to an analyst for specific
investment banking transactions, but specifically allows the broker-
dealer to pay for general performance including the analyst's
performance with regard to the Investment Banking Department.'33
2. Personal Conflicts and the NYSE
Like the NASD, the NYSE imposes restrictions on the trading
of the analyst. It has many of the same requirements, including:
prohibiting the analyst from receiving shares prior to an IPO if the
analyst covers the industry,"' prohibiting purchases and sales for 30
days before a research report and five days after,'135 and prohibiting
transactions contrary to the analysts recommendation.'36 The rule
also has many of the same exceptions, including changes in
financial circumstances, significant news or events regarding the
company and ownership in investment companies and mutual
129. Id. §§ 472(b)(3)(i)-(ii).
130. Id. § 472(b)(3)(iii).
131. Id. §§ 472(g)(1)-(3).
132- Id. § 472(g).
133. Id. § 472(h).
134. Id. § 472(e)(1).
135. Id. § 472(e)(2).
136. Id. § 472(e)(3).
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funds.'37 However, the NYSE provides two further exceptions:
" A sale within 30 days of employment, when an analyst is new
to the broker-dealer, and if the security was purchased prior
to employment;3 '
" A sale within 30 days of a research report if the securities
were purchased prior to the broker-dealer initiating its
coverage of the company.
3 9
3. Disclosures
Like the rest of the NYSE rule, the proposed disclosure for
both research reports and public appearances are almost identical.
Both require that the disclosures be made on either the front cover
or be mentioned there with a page reference.1"" Although the
heading for the NYSE's rule states that it is for research reports
and scheduled public appearances, 4' the text of the rule appears to
apply to all public appearances, like the NASD's rule, and not just
scheduled appearances.' 2 Like the NASD, the NYSE rule requires
disclosure in the following circumstances: if a broker-dealer owns
more than 1% of stock five days before publication,' if the analyst
or household member has a financial interest in the issuer,'" if any
other material conflicts exist, and if the analyst is an officer,
45
director, or on the advisory board of the issuer.'46 Additionally,
just like the NASD, the NYSE requires disclosure of compensation
to a broker-dealer for investment banking activities within the past
year and reasonably expected revenues in the following three
137. Id. §§ 472(e)(4)(i)-(iii).
138. Id. § 472(e)(4)(iii).
139. Id. § 472(e)(4)(iv).
140. Id. § 472(k)(2).
141. Id. § 472(k)(1).
142. Id. § 472(k)(1)(i). The text of the rule requires disclosure in a public
appearance, not scheduled appearances as indicated in the heading. Id.
143. Id. § 472(k)(i)(a).
144. Id. § 472(k)(i)(b).
145. Id. § 472(k)(i)(c).
146. Id. § 472(k)(1)(iii).
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months,147 as well as the disclosure of compensation received by an
analyst preparing the report related to investment banking
revenues. 148
Finally, the NYSE follows the NASD's rules requiring a
significant amount of investor protection disclosures. These
include: definitions of the classifications of recommendations,
however, the NYSE specifically says that it must be plain meaning
and that a hold cannot mean sell,' 49 disclosure of percentages of
each rating the broker-dealer has and the percent of the total firms
from which the broker-dealer received investment banking
revenues in the past 12 months,5° valuation methods with risks that
would stop the price from reaching the target,"' disclosure if the
broker-dealer makes a market in a security,"' and finally the price
chart depicting when the broker-dealer had a change in rating.'53
IV. COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED RULES
The proposed rules have made a valiant effort at addressing
the conflict issues. Some have complained that the rules have
created too much red tape for broker-dealers and analysts. '54
These critics feel that the rules inhibit the reporting of timely
information by requiring too much involvement from legal and
compliance departments.'55 Thus, while it appears that these rules
were a good start, issues remain. 56
A. Clearer Chinese Walls
The rules make an attempt at recreating the "Chinese Wall"
147. Id. § 472(k)(1)(ii).
148. Id. § 472(k)(2).
149. Id. § 472(k)(2)(iii).
150. Id. § 472(k)(2)(iv).
151. Id. § 472(k)(2)(ii).
152. Id. § 472(k)(2)(i).
153. Id. § 472(k)(2)(v).
154. See, e.g., John Labate & Juliana Ratner, Mixed Reaction to Analyst Rules,
FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 8,2002, at 30.
155. See id.
156. See infra Parts IV.A-E (providing a review of some of the problems the
rules face).
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between the investment banking department and analysts, but is
the wall clear enough? Prior to the rule proposals, commentators
suggested the need for clearer walls between investment bankers
and analysts.'57
Two ways in which the rules address this conflict are by
eliminating the possibility for the investment banking division to
exert control or supervision over an analyst and prohibiting
analysts' compensation from being tied to specific investment
banking transactions or procedures.'58 This does not prevent the
analyst from participating in investment banking activities and
does not stop analyst's compensation from being tied to general
investment banking activities."9 The NYSE rule even states that
the analyst can be compensated for general performance, including
their performance with regard to the investment bank.'" These
rules leave the door open for manipulative practices.
Commentators have stated that broker-dealers can "veil"
compensation for investment banking activity, ' and while they
may not exert control, one commentator has said that a simple
raised eyebrow could do the trick.'62
The truth is, "until the 'Chinese Wall' between research and
investment banking is restored at the brokerage houses, there will
continue to be a problem with analyst objectivity."'63 There are a
few simple rules that could help rebuild the wall. One is to
implement a "no-selling" rule."' This would stop an analyst from
157. See Jacob H. Zamansky, Outside Counsel Assessing Analysts' Liability for
Securities Fraud, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 3, 2002, at 1; Bowman Testimony, supra note 7;
Hill Testimony, supra note 46.
158. See Proposed Rule 472, supra note 124, §§ 472(b)(1), (h); Proposed Rule
2711, supra note 9, §§ 2711(b)(1), (d).
159. See sources cited supra note 158.
160. Proposed Rule 472, supra note 124, § 472(h).
161. See Becker, supra note 30; Coffee Testimony, supra note 48.
162. See Coffee Testimony, supra note 48 ("It is easy to imagine veiled or
stylized communications that signal that the investment banking division is
displeased and will reduce the analyst's compensation at the next regular salary
review. Such signals, even if they consists [sic] only of arched eyebrows, are
effectively impossible to prohibit.").
163. Hill Testimony, supra note 46.
164. See Coffee Testimony, supra note 48.
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participating in any selling activity.'65 For instance, an analyst
would not be able to participate in investment banking activities
like road shows.'66 This would be a return to a more traditional
"Chinese Wall" from a decade ago, whereby the investment
bankers did their due diligence on an issuer, not analysts.67 While
using analysts in the process saves time and money by avoiding
duplicative work,'68 bringing an analyst over the wall is a key
contributor to the conflicts dilemma. In this scenario, a research
analyst would not be assigned to cover an issue until after the
investment banking team completed an offering.'69
A final proposal would be to limit analysts from covering
companies who are clients of their employer. While this may
cause analysts to use up time in evaluating companies in a sector
that they can't issue a report for, it would potentially relieve many
of the pressures they face.'
B. Disclosure
The rules require lots of clear and concise disclosure that must
be prominently displayed.' While this disclosure will help, one of
the most important issues is investor education.' For instance, the
disclosures regarding owning shares and the broker-dealer's
participation in an offering could serve to confuse individual
investors. 4 If an individual investor does not understand the
conflicts that an analyst or broker-dealer faces, these disclosures
could give the appearance that the analyst and broker-dealer
believe in the company and therefore own shares.'75 Moreover,
individual investors may not know the meaning of market maker
165. ' See id.
166. See id.
167. See Michaely & Womack, supra note 63, at 655.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Coffee Testimony, supra note 48.
171. See id.
172- See supra Parts III.A.3, III.B.3.
173. See Unger Testimony, supra note 55.
174. See Roper Letter, supra note 41.
175. See id.
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and again disclosure could be misleading. 6 One solution is to
provide an additional section aside from the disclosures required
by the rules explaining the conflicts that analysts face so individual
investors can understand the reason for the disclosures.
7 7
Another problem is that while the rules require clear
explanations of analyst's buy, sell and hold type ratings,78 they do
not require one system. A more effective way to deal with the
situation is to institute a universal ratings system for all analyst
reports. 9 This would eliminate confusion for individual investors
when they review research reports from different broker-dealers
and a broker-dealer would have more trouble veiling negative
reports.
Additionally, the rules require disclosures when an analyst
makes a public appearance.' While this is a great idea, the analyst
and broker-dealers do not have control over what the final version
of a public statement may be."' These disclosures could end up on
newsroom floors.'82 Thus, the rule should require that the analyst
and broker-dealer use their best efforts to have these disclosures
made, requiring certain steps that must be taken so that the media
sources clearly understand the importance of this disclosure.
A final problem is that the rules limit who has to make
disclosures. Thus, an individual investor who is receiving
information from his broker about a research analyst's
recommendations on securities does not have to disclose any
conflicts.'83  Yet, if the broker is disclosing the analyst's
recommendation, the conflicts once again are important pieces to
the entire information puzzle. To properly protect investors these
types of disclosures should be extended to sales forces in this
situation."
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See supra Parts IV.A.3, IV.B.3.
179. See Torres Testimony, supra note 6; Bowman Testimony, supra note 7.
180. See supra Parts III.A.3, III.B.3.
181. See Bowman Testimony, supra note 7.
182. See id.
183. See Roper Letter, supra note 41.
184. See id.
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C. Personal and Broker-Dealer Conflicts
While the rules provide limitations on trading by an analyst
and his household, they do not restrict the trading of a broker-
dealer in its proprietary accounts. Conflicts arise not only from an
analyst's holdings in a stock, but also the firm can put pressure on
an analyst to issue positive ratings for its own profit.'85 Thus, the
trading restrictions imposed by the rules on analysts should extend
to the broker-dealer's proprietary accounts.
A broker-dealer may also pressure an analyst for the broker's
own personal gain by encouraging buy recommendations.'86
Having an analyst issue positive reports can cause more buying by
investors and commissions for the broker-dealer."8  A possible
solution for this is universal ratings systems, so that broker-dealers
cannot hide sell recommendations in the guise of holds. However,
this issue will almost certainly remain because the true reason that
broker-dealers employ analysts is for profit. 8
D. Participants Outside of the Broker-Dealer
Another issue not contemplated by these rules is that analysts
depend on information from sources beyond the broker-dealer.'89
This was partly the problem in Enron, the information the analysts
were receiving from Enron was not accurate, causing analysts'
forecasts to be skewed." Thus, the SEC needs to regulate these
companies to ensure that the information an analyst is reviewing is
correct. Hopefully, this type of regulation will be instituted in
conjunction with the Enron fallout."
185. See Coffee, supra note 46, at 5; Understanding Analyst Recommendations,
supra note 72.
186. See Unger Testimony, supra note 55.
187. See id.; Coffee Testimony, supra note 48.
188. See Becker, supra note 30 (explaining that broker-dealers employ
analysts to make money).
189. See Enron Corp. and Wall Street Analysts: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Curt N.
Launer, Managing Director, Credit Suisse First Boston).
190. See id.
191. See id.
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E. Conflicts the Rules Do Not Address That May Never Be
Eliminated
There are two conflicts that the rules do not address which
may never be eliminated. First, analysts face pressure from
institutional investors who are customers of the firm and pressure
analysts to create profitable investments.92 Second, analysts feel
pressure from issuers. This pressure occurs even when an issuer is
not a client of the firm because the issuer's management could
retaliate against a bad report by cutting off the analyst's access to
management, or not answering an analyst's questions on
conference calls.9 Moreover, an issuer could carry ill will against
the analyst and, in turn, the broker-dealer for whom the analyst
works.'94  This could prevent management from using the
investment banking services of the broker-dealer in the future.9
A radical way to address both of these concerns would be to
completely divorce research departments from broker-dealers.'96
Make them an independent group who sells research for a cost and
thus is self-sufficient. "  This would provide the most objective
research available and would also remove many of the conflicts
addressed by the rules. However, the rules have merely served as
"piecemeal reform" by trying to address issues independently.'98
In addition to divorcing the departments, the SEC needs to
draft some kind of anti-retaliation rule;'99 one that covers both
retaliation from within a broker-dealer and from issuers outside."°
This rule should recognize that retaliation can be hidden and hard
to prove, thus, arbitration of these type of claims could help to
resolve the problem when this type of claim is raised by an
192. See Unger Testimony, supra note 55; see also supra Part III.C (providing
a further explanation of this conflict).
193. See Susan Pulliam, Analysts to Tell Congress That Skepticism Gets Them
Abuse, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2002, at Cl; Unger Testimony, supra note 55.
194. See Coffee Testimony, supra note 48.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See Torres Testimony, supra note 6.
198. See Coffee Testimony, supra note 48.
199. See id.
200. See id.
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analyst."0 '
Finally, even if the analyst's are not separated from the
remainder of a broker-dealer, a "no booster shot" rule would help
address the conflicts faced by an analyst whose investment banking
department is being considered by an issuer for an IPO. 2'2 As
mentioned, one of the qualities the issuer is looking for is strong
analysts who will help support the price of the stock in the after
market for this security. 3 Management is particularly interested
from a personal prospective because shares issued to management
has a lock-up which prohibits them from selling shares for up to six
months.' 4 The proposed rule only requires a 40 day quiet period, 5
thus, the analyst will be able to provide "booster shots" before the
six month management lock-up expires. 2" A more effective rule
would prevent the analyst who works for the investment bank
representing an issuer from issuing reports during the entire six
month lock-up period.0 7
CONCLUSION
The NASD and NYSE's attempts at correcting the current
industry problems are a step in the right direction. They should
help to alleviate some of the current problems faced by analysts.
However, the only solution that would effectively remedy all the
problems involves completely removing the research departments
from the reach of broker-dealers; make them an independent and
self-contained body that is not influenced in any way by either the
broker-dealer, its clients, customers and employees. As this will
take time, instituting some interim reforms mentioned in Section V
could provide an effective short-term solution to analyst conflicts
of interests.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See supra notes 102-103, 131 and accompanying text.
206. See Coffee Testimony, supra note 48.
207. See id.
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